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1981 DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AGREEMENT (DECA) NEGOTIATIONS WITH GREECE

Negotiating Environment. The 1980-81 negotiations with Greece were designed to revise the stillborn 1977 DCA so that it paralleled the just-concluded 1980 DECA with Turkey. The Greek government suspended talks after five months of actual negotiations, ostensibly because of Parliament's recess. In fact, the government had concluded that any likely agreement would not contain the kinds of concessions consistent with the expectations it had raised among Greeks: that it would improve upon the already restrictive 1977 agreement. While this possibly could have been managed under other circumstances, at the time the party in office faced elections in the fall and was coming under increasingly effective attack from the Socialist opposition leader, Andreas Papandreou.

General Objectives. The main US goal was to do away with the multi-year assistance commitment; this would also obviate the need for Congressional approval. A second US objective was to remove as many, if not all, of the more operationally and status-limiting provisions that had been accepted in 1977 (the 1976 DCA with Turkey, on which those limitations were based, had never entered into force). The 1980 DECA with Turkey was far less restrictive than its predecessor, and this new "model" would, it was hoped, convince the Greek government that its interests lay in a similar revision of the 1977 DCA. In essence, the Greek government was not convinced and insisted on most of the 1977 provisions.

General Operating Rights and Flexibility of Use. When the talks were suspended, one of the main outstanding issues remaining was the specific authorization of all current US activities, especially those that could not arguably be said to arise out of NATO obligations. While such a restriction in the case of Turkey was not unduly onerous, it would have caused us considerable problems in Greece, where most of our activities have no direct relation to NATO missions.

Out-of-Area Transits/Overflights. The new agreement would have validated the applicable 1977 classified technical arrangement, but the relationship between it and the continued authorization of non-NATO activities had not been resolved.

Quid. The Greek government accepted the replacement of a multi-year assistance commitment with a "best efforts" pledge. It nonetheless insisted that we promise to provide significant amounts of equipment at no or low cost and to guarantee the

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delivery of considerable amounts of purchased equipment. We did not agree. Another financial quid with political implications was the Greek insistence on committing the US to preserve the balance of military forces in the region, including between Greece and Turkey, in a way that would bless the 7:10 ratio. We did not agree. Politically, Greece sought US reaffirmation of its opposition to the threat or use of force to settle disputes in the eastern Mediterranean. An oral reaffirmation procedure was agreed--over Turkish objections.

SOFA. The additional restrictions which the Greek side had proposed to the ones accepted in 1977 would have rendered the SOFA unacceptable. The provisions would have adversely affected the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, imposed unreasonable taxes on vehicles, subjected US forces to all Greek labor laws, and severely limited the size of the civilian component. The SOFA the Greek side proposed would have been the one of the most onerous arrangements applicable to US forces abroad.

Other. Principles of defense industrial cooperation were agreed, though Greece unsuccessfully sought to commit us to lease equipment and to assist otherwise in implementing projects. We also resisted Greece's efforts to embroil us in its differences with Turkey over the Aegean's air space and territorial sea.

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